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limate change in the Arctic is expected to make 
the region a lot busier as new strategic 
resources become available. The Russian 
Federation is a key player in this context, having put 
forth a comprehensive Arctic strategy. Russian policy 
towards the so-called High North, however, is 
oftentimes not seen in its entirety and has received a 
plethora of criticism in the Western media and foreign 
policy community. This paper aims to contribute to a 
better understanding of Russian actions in the High 
North by providing a succinct overview of Russian 
policies in the region and identifying the fundamental 
rationale behind them. The paper concludes that 
Russia’s Arctic policy is not only a lot more nuanced 
but also not very different from the policies conducted 
by other riparian states. 
Introduction 
The failure to clinch a legally-binding deal in 
Copenhagen that limits global warming to two degrees 
Celsius does not bode well for environmental stability. 
This holds particularly true for the High North. 
Global warming is changing the Arctic region at a 
dramatic pace. The Arctic is, according to numerous 
studies, expecting temperature increases of between 
four and seven degrees Celsius by the end of this 
century.
1 While previous climate models have 
predicted an ice-free Arctic during the summertime by 
2030, recently published research suggests that the 
summer ice cap may already vanish by 2015. This 
should come as no surprise; in summer 2008, the 
Arctic region was already 65% ice-free and the years 
2007-2009 saw the greatest decreases on record, with 
                                                      
1 2004 Arctic Climate Impact Assessment (ACIA). 
the ice cap dwindling to a record-low minimum extent 
of 4.3 million square km in September 2007.
2 
These developments open up an array of intractable 
challenges, including threats to biodiversity and the 
traditional way of life of autochthon communities in 
the Arctic region. Of particular danger to global 
environmental stability, however, is the threat to low-
lying coastal regions posed by rising sea levels. This 
would not only have immense political, environmental 
and social consequences; the economic effects would 
also be tremendous. According to Allianz financial 
services, a rise of half a metre by the middle of this 
century could put at risk more than 28 trillion dollars’ 
worth of assets in the world’s largest coastal cities.
3 In 
addition, increasing temperatures in this volatile region 
are triggering strong feedback mechanisms such as the 
release of methane due to melting permafrost and the 
ice-albedo feedback loop,
4 which accelerate global 
warming and thereby further upset global 
environmental stability. 
At the same time, the melting of the Arctic is 
unlocking a wide range of opportunities, with the 
dwindling ice cap allowing increased access to the 
region’s large resource base. Besides valuable fishing 
stocks and both base and precious metals, the Arctic 
                                                      
2  Melting Snow and Ice, Centre for Ice, Climate and 
Ecosystems, Norwegian Polar Institute, 14 December 2009. A 
report commissioned by Al Gore and Norway’s Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre (http://www.regjeringen.no/ 
upload/UD/Vedlegg/klima/melting_ice_report.pdf). 
3 “Sea level rise could cost port cities $28 trillion”, CNN, 23 
November 2009 (http://edition.cnn.com/2009/TECH/science/ 
11/23/climate.report.wwf.allianz/index.html). 
4 The ‘ice-albedo feedback loop’ is the process whereby 
retreating sea ice exposes darker and less reflective seawater, 
which absorbs more heat and in turn causes more ice to melt. 
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region is also rich in hydrocarbons. According to the 
US Geological Survey, the High North could be home 
to 13% of the world’s undiscovered oil, 30% of 
undiscovered natural gas and 20% of undiscovered 
natural gas liquids.
5 This is especially relevant in the 
context of resource depletion in existing fields and is 
illustrated by Norway’s Petroleum Directorate bi-
annual resource report,
6 which state that Norway 
would have to go deeper into the Arctic in order to 
maintain its oil production capacity. 
Ice-free summers by 2015 would also make new 
strategic sea lanes accessible, notably the Northwest 
Passage (sovereignty asserted by Canada) and the 
Northern Sea Route (sovereignty asserted by Russia). 
These routes would shorten the distances between 
Europe and East Asia, leading to lower shipping costs 
and thereby benefiting global trade.  
A panoply of countries aims to gain a hold over these 
strategic resources. Foremost among these are the 
‘Arctic 5’: the riparian states of Canada, Norway, 
Denmark/Greenland, the United States and the Russian 
Federation.
7 However, the A5 are not alone in 
maintaining an interest in the Arctic Region. A host of 
new players is emerging in the High North. The 
European Union is currently promoting its Arctic 
Communication, and Commissioners Piebalgs and 
Borg have both stressed the EU’s interest in the High 
North.
8 China, meanwhile, is undertaking extensive 
research in this region with its 21,000-tonne icebreaker 
Xue Long (Snow Dragon), while both South Korea and 
Japan are building polar-class shipping tankers in order 
to prepare themselves for the shorter sea lanes that are 
gradually opening up. Most recently, NATO’s new 
Secretary General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, also 
declared his intention to increase the alliance’s role in 
the Arctic. 
The strategic sealanes and resources the region holds, 
together with the confluence of major Arctic powers, 
risk the emergence of, at best, political tensions, and at 
worst a new ‘great game’. All circumpolar states are 
keen to increase their sovereignty over Arctic waters 
by extending their Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ) 
under the United Nations Convention on the Law of 
the Sea (UNCLOS), and there are currently a variety of 
sovereignty disputes over territory. In addition, all 
parties have announced increases in their Arctic 
military capacities and exchanged fiery rhetoric. 
Whether the patchy legal and institutional frameworks 
                                                      
5  Circum-Arctic Resource Appraisal: Estimates of 
Undiscovered Oil and Gas North of the Arctic Circle, US 
Geological Survey, 2008 (http://pubs.usgs.gov/fs/2008/3049/). 
6 http://www.npd.no/no/Publikasjoner/Ressursrapporter/2009/.  
7 A map showing the disputes among the circumpolar states, 
as well as the strategic resources, can be found in the annex. 
8 Roderick Kefferputz & Claude Weinber, “Safeguarding Arctic 
Resources”, European Voice, 8 January 2009. 
covering this region are sufficient to prevent a descent 
into chaos remains to be seen. The region’s main 
institution, the Arctic Council, is primarily a soft law 
body with no binding decision-making powers, 
permanent secretariat, dedicated staff or fixed budget, 
inspiring little confidence in its ability to do so.  
One major player that has received particular attention 
from the foreign policy community is the Russian 
Federation. With the longest Arctic border, Russia is 
staking significant claims to the region which, if 
accepted, would provide it with roughly 45% of the 
High North. Understandably, the Arctic features 
prominently in Russian political discourse and policy. 
President Medvedev has identified the Arctic as 
national heritage, stating that “we must ensure reliable 
protection in the long-term for Russia’s national 
interests in the Arctic”.
9 Correspondingly, Russia’s 
Strategy for National Security until 2020 has upgraded 
the High North to one of its priorities, identifying it as 
prone to future military conflict, particularly over its 
resource wealth.
10  
Foreign governments, experts and the wider media 
have decried Russian manoeuvres in the region as 
jingoistic, if not belligerent. These statements and 
analyses, however, in tending to focus primarily on the 
military aspect of Russia’s Arctic policy, fail to take 
into account its finer nuances and intricacies. In fact, 
Russia’s approach towards this region is rather more 
complex and multi-dimensional, reflecting not only the 
numerous different Russian interests in the region but 
also the influence of intangibles such as ideas and 
identity on Russian policy-making. 
In addition, the Kremlin has many towers and should 
not be treated as a monolith; there are many different 
actors in Moscow with competing influences and 
official as well as personal agendas towards the Arctic. 
This needs to be acknowledged in any objective 
analysis. Last but not least, Russian policy should also 
be seen in the context of the policies conducted by the 
other riparian states. Moscow’s Arctic approach, 
viewed in the context of the recent Russia-Georgia 
war, is often demonised, while in actual fact Russian 
policy towards the High North does not greatly differ 
from those of its counterparts.  
This paper aims to contribute to a better understanding 
of Russian actions in the High North by providing a 
succinct overview of Russian policies in the region and 
identifying the fundamental rationale behind them. 
                                                      
9 Speech of President Medvedev at a meeting of the Russian 
Security Council on Protecting Russia’s National Interests in 
the Arctic, Moscow, 17 September 2008 
(http://eng.kremlin.ru/text/speeches/2008/09/17/1945_type8291
2type82913_206564.shtml). 
10  Strategy for National Security until 2020 (Strategiya 
natsionalnoy bezopasnosti Rossiizkoy Federatsii do 2020 
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This is relevant to the extent that Russia, as a main 
actor in this fragile region, will together with the other 
Arctic states define the region’s future development 
and the levels of co-operation and/or confrontation. 
Failing to understand or misinterpreting Russian policy 
and raison d’être in the region could therefore lead to 
the wrong policy responses. This could have 
detrimental consequences, putting the overall strategic 
objective of maintaining stability and peace in the 
region at risk. 
The paper is structured as follows: The first section 
provides an overview of Russia’s relationship and 
claim to the Arctic, with the second identifying its 
main interests in the region. The third section 
examines Russian policy towards the High North and 
identifies some of the different actors and agendas 
within those policies. Section four concludes.  
Russia and its Arctic claim 
The Arctic naturally plays an important role for 
Russia, as more than one-third of Russian territory lies 
north of the Arctic Circle. Russia began expressing a 
concrete interest in the region as early as the late 
19
th/early 20
th century, and in 1910 sent its navy to 
explore and map the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which 
runs along the north coast of Russia. The region was 
also significant during Soviet times, when several 
expeditions to the Arctic lands were undertaken in 
order to set up permanent polar stations and exercise 
sovereignty. Numerous flags were planted during this 
period, including on the westernmost area of Arctic 
territory in the Soviet sector, Victoria Island, on 29 
August 1932, and on the North Pole itself on 21 May 
1937 by the Papanin expedition.
11 In 1926, the Soviet 
leadership took the unilateral decision to establish new 
state borders in the Arctic, declaring 5,842 square 
kilometres of territory between the North Pole, the 
Bering Strait and the Kola Peninsula as part of the 
Soviet Union. During Stalin’s industrialisation drive, 
the Soviet regime was also quick to capitalise on the 
Arctic’s resources by opening up mines at Vorkuta and 
Norilsk in the 1930s, while industrial fishing in the 
region took place later in the 1950s.
12 Perhaps most 
importantly, the High North was also a focal point 
during the Cold War due to its strategic proximity 
between the US and the Russian Federation, which 
lead to high submarine activity because of technical 
                                                      
11 Other notable expeditions included journeys to Wrangel 
Island in 1926, Franz Josef Land in 1929 and Severnaya 
Zemlya in 1930. For more information on a history of the 
Arctic Region during Imperial Russian and Soviet times see: 
Zhukov, Yuri. “The Russian Flag in the Arctic”, Zhurnal Neft’ 
Rossii, No. 4, 2003. 
12 Marlène Laruelle, “Russia’s Arctic Ambitions: Transforming 
the ‘Cost of Cold’”, Policy Brief, No. 7, Institute for Security & 
Development Policy, 9 June 2009. 
difficulties with detection under the Arctic ice. For the 
Soviet Union it was also particularly important in this 
context as it provided the only year-round access to the 
Atlantic from the ice-free ports on the Kola Peninsula 
through the Barents and Norwegian seas. Attempts at 
improving relations in the High North and decreasing 
militarisation in this field, whether genuine or not, 
were articulated as early as 1958 by the Soviets when 
Premier Nikolai Bulganin proposed a zone in northern 
Europe “free of atomic and hydrogen weapons”. Real 
steps towards better relations in the North, however, 
only came to fruition with Mikhail Gorbachev who 
launched the “Murmansk Initiative” in 1987, calling 
for an Arctic “zone of peace”.
13 This initiative, in 
conjunction with Finnish efforts, helped pave the way 
for the creation of the Arctic Environmental Protection 
Strategy (AEPS), a non-binding multilateral agreement 
among Arctic states aimed at environmental 
protection, which was absorbed into the Arctic Council 
in 1996. 
With the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the High 
North became less of a priority as the new Russian 
Federation sought to re-arrange its relationship with 
the West and the former Soviet bloc countries. Only in 
the late 1990s, particularly with the accession of 
Vladimir Putin to power, did the Arctic gain a greater 
strategic importance. After having ratified the United 
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea 
(UNCLOS)
14 in 1997, Moscow made its first legal 
Arctic claim in 2001 with a submission to the UN 
Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf 
(CLCS), which is empowered to take decisions on 
extensions of the continental shelf, to extend its 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) beyond the 200-mile 
radius. In this submission it argued that about 1.2 
million square km of underwater terrain should be 
added to the Russian EEZ as this area lies between the 
Lomonosov and Mendeleev ridges, which it claims are 
a continuation of the Siberian shelf. If this application 
were to be accepted, Russia would be able to claim up 
to 45% of the Arctic. Russia’s request, however, was 
put on ice, as it were, by the CLCS in 2002 due to 
insufficient scientific data. 
                                                      
13 See Dan Hayward, “Gorbachev’s Murmansk Initiative: New 
Prospects for Arms Control in the Arctic?”, Northern 
Perspectives, Canadian Arctic Resources Committee, Vol. 16, 
No. 4, July-August 1988 and Kristian Atland, “Mikhail 
Gorbachev, the Murmansk Initiative, and the Desecuritization 
of Interstate Relations in the Arctic”, Cooperation and Conflict, 
Vol. 43, No. 3, 2008. 
14 UNCLOS covers all segments of the ocean space and 
regulates the area on a large number of issues such as the 
delimitation of the continental shelf boundaries. The Law of the 
Sea grants countries an economic zone of 200 nautical miles 
beyond their land borders, which can be extended if the country 
in question can prove that the structure of the continental shelf 
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Moscow therefore redoubled its efforts, using its 
Arctic capacity to explore the High North. Several 
expeditions were dispatched in order to collect further 
geological data. One particularly noteworthy 
expedition, Arktika 2007, took place in summer 2007, 
when Russia sent out its the research vessel Akademik 
Fedorov, reinforced by the nuclear ice-breaker 
Rossiya, in order to strengthen its claim with more 
scientific evidence. During this expedition, headed by 
Artur Chilingarov, Vice-Speaker of the Russian Duma 
and famous polar explorer, two mini-submarines (Mir-
1 and Mir-2) descended over 4,200 meters to the ocean 
seabed at the North Pole and planted a titanium 
Russian flag. The expedition cost the Kremlin around 
€45 million and Mr Chilingarov was subsequently 
made Presidential Envoy to the Arctic. This Arctic 
stunt not only raised national sentiments back in 
Moscow but was widely reported in the foreign press 
with a media frenzy that, particularly in the context of 
Putin’s Munich speech in February 2007, led to 
alarmism and increasing Western defiance. Former 
Canadian Foreign Minister Peter MacKay, for 
example, criticised the mission stating that “this isn’t 
the 15
th century […] you can’t go around the world and 
just plant flags and say ‘We are claiming this 
territory’”.
15 Little did he know that two years 
previously, his compatriot Bill Graham, the then 
Defence Minister, had planted the Canadian flag on 
Hans Island, which is disputed by Canada and 
Denmark.  
The Russian flag-planting exercise, however, was just 
a sideshow taking place alongside the gathering of 
crucial geological information. According to 
statements from Russia’s Natural Resources Ministry, 
the  Arktika  2007 expedition can be considered a 
success as the supposed results of the “analysis of the 
earth crust model examined […] confirmed that the 
crust structure of the Lomonosov Ridge corresponds to 
the world analogues of the continental crust, and […] 
is therefore part of the Russian Federation’s adjacent 
continental shelf”.
16 
Russia is determined to push for increased sovereignty 
in the High North under the international legal 
framework. This is particularly the case as it stands to 
gain immensely from the Arctic resources. 
Russian interests in the Arctic 
As stated by President Medvedev at a meeting of the 
Russian Security Council in September 2008, the 
Arctic region already “accounts for around 20% of 
                                                      
15 “Russia plants flag under North Pole”, BBC News, 2 August 
2007 (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6927395.stm).  
16 “Lomonosov Ridge, Mendeleyev elevation part of Russia’s 
shelf – report”, Interfax, Moscow, 20 September 2007. 
Russia’s gross domestic product (GDP) and 22% of 
national exports”.
17  
The region therefore holds tremendous economic 
benefits for Russia. The following aspects are of 
particular interest: 
  Oil and gas: The Arctic contains 80% of Russia’s 
discovered natural gas reserves and is home to 
giant offshore and onshore hydrocarbon deposits 
such as Shtokman and Yamal. The region is also 
the world’s largest untouched oil and gas reserve, 
according to assessments conducted by the US 
Geological Survey and Statoil. These are of great 
interest to the national gas industry as it seeks to 
replace dwindling production from legacy fields.  
The rising interest in these reserves has, among 
others, led to the development of new technologies 
abroad in order to tap those resources. The US 
offshore drilling giant Transocean, for example, 
has announced that it is close to sealing a long-
term contract, possibly with ExxonMobil, which 
would lead to the construction of a new Arctic 
Class drilling rig, going at a minimum daily rate of 
$700,000, as well as ice-class drillships.
18 
Norwegian offshore drilling contractor, Aker 
Drilling, has recently completed the construction 
of two semi-submersible drilling rigs capable of 
ultra-deep water drilling and operating in harsh 
environments. These top-of-the-class sixth 
generation rigs, which are the largest in the world, 
are practically designed for Arctic conditions.
19 In 
a similar vein, Shell is also planning to build 
seaworthy liquefied natural gas (LNG) plants that 
can operate in remote and environmentally-
sensitive areas, such as the Arctic. The Russian 
Federation is particularly interested in these 
developments. Gazprom’s subsidiary 
Sevmorneftegaz, for example, is already working 
on a rig that will be capable of operating in 
temperatures as low as minus 50 degrees Celsius 
and which will be able to withstand the impact of 
ice packs. This rig, the Prirazlomnaya platform, 
will be one of Russia’s first Arctic offshore oil 
fields in production.  
In spite of this, however, the Russian oil and gas 
industry still needs to catch up with its Western 
competitors in terms of technology and expertise, 
explaining Gazprom’s decision to partner up with 
                                                      
17 Speech of President Medvedev at a meeting of the Russian 
Security Council on Protecting Russia’s National Interests in 
the Arctic, Moscow, 17 September 2008 (http://eng.kremlin.ru/ 
text/speeches/2008/09/17/1945_type82912type82913_206564.s
html). 
18 “Arctic drilling”, Upstream, 15 November 2009. 
19 “New drilling rigs for Arctic climate”, Barents Observer, 
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Statoil and Total in developing the massive 
Shtokman field. This is particularly the case when 
it comes to Russia’s exploration companies, which 
lag behind their Western counterparts in providing 
seismic and other appraisal services. In this 
context, Russia’s Natural Resource Ministry may 
oversee an amalgamation of 49 state-owned 
geological companies into a single entity called 
‘Rosgeologiya’.
20 But private companies are also 
affected. Lukoil, for example, might find it 
difficult to invest millions in acquiring new 
seismic technologies and drilling appraisal wells 
without having state guarantees that it will obtain a 
development licence in the event of a discovery. 
Another factor possibly impeding the development 
of Arctic hydrocarbon resources, besides the 
relative costs and technology, is legislation that 
only allows state-controlled oil company Rosneft 
and gas giant Gazprom to work in Russian 
offshore zones in the far North. Natural Resources 
Minister, Yuri Trutnev, has raised concerns 
regarding this government decision as it could 
prevent investment in these fields; Gazprom and 
Rosneft would perhaps be better served to secure 
competitive fields before tapping those reserves to 
which only they have access.  
Besides, oil and gas, the Arctic region contains 
many other economic benefits for the Russian 
Federation:  
  Base and precious metals: The High North is 
particularly rich in strategically important 
nonferrous and precious metals, hosting large 
high-grade copper, zinc, diamonds, tin, gold, silver 
and nickel deposits. The Noril’sk industrial area of 
Taymyr, for instance, provides up to 20% of the 
world’s nickel production.
21 
  Fishing stocks: The Arctic is also home to 
important bio-marine resources. Cod in the Barents 
Sea and pollock in the Russian Far East of the 
Arctic represent roughly 25% of the global catch 
of whitefish.
22 Moreover, polar invertebrates 
represent a valuable resource for the chemical and 
pharmaceutical sectors as they are used in the 
production of analgesics and other types of 
medication, as well as for food and drink 
preservation. As such, with decreasing fish stocks 
                                                      
20 “Russia calls for state takeover”, Upstream, 11 December 
2009. 
21 I.Y. Frolov, V.Y. Alexandrov, Ye.U. Mironov, A.G. 
Gorshkovsky, N.G. Babich and V.G. Smirnov, “Afterword”, in 
Remote Sensing of Sea Ice in the Northern Sea Route: Studies 
and Applications, Berlin: Springer Praxis Books, 2007. 
22 Illegal Fishing in Arctic Waters, WWF International Arctic 
Programme, April 2008. 
in traditional waters, commercial fishing in the 
Arctic region will become increasingly attractive. 
  New shipping lanes: By 2015, or perhaps even 
earlier, the melting of ice in the High North could 
make new strategic summer sea lanes within the 
Northwest Passage (sovereignty asserted by 
Canada but called into question by the US and EU) 
and the Northern Sea Route (sovereignty asserted 
by Russia, but open to international commercial 
navigation) even more accessible.
23 Operating an 
Arctic route currently requires icebreakers and is 
therefore very costly; the melting of Arctic ice, 
however, would eliminate this obstacle. The 
Northern Sea Route could significantly reduce 
transportation costs, as well as carbon dioxide 
emissions, as it may cut the length of the Europe - 
East Asia route by 40%. The traditional Suez 
Canal route between Hamburg and Yokohama 
(18,350 km), for example, would be reduced to 
11,100 km using the Northern Sea Route.
24 Such 
new commercial sea lanes could relieve congestion 
at bottlenecks such as the Suez and Panama Canals 
as well as the Strait of Malacca. In addition, they 
would avoid the politically volatile Middle East 
and piracy at the Horn of Africa. However, the 
attractiveness of a summer ice-free sea also re-
opens discussions on sovereignty over new routes 
and the presence of third countries’ warships. In 
addition, heavier maritime traffic in the Arctic 
region increases the likelihood of accidents, as 
well as of invasive species entering the eco-system 
through ballast waters. 
Russia’s Northern Sea Route (NSR) is currently 
open to limited international commercial 
navigation. In fact, in September last year, two 
German merchant vessels managed to pass through 
the formerly impenetrable passage with assistance 
of Russian icebreakers. However, NSR’s shallow 
straight passages with a maximum depth of only 
17 metres, in addition to the lack of port 
infrastructure, considerably constrain its 
commercial navigation potential. In this context, 
investments in port infrastructure in the High 
North have been greatly debated in the Russian 
Duma, particularly the region of Murmansk.  
A future point of contention as regards the NSR 
may be the charging of transit fees by Russia to 
foreign vessels. The European Union, with the 
world’s largest merchant fleet, is particularly 
concerned over arbitrary transit charges on its 
vessels. This issue is reminiscent of the Siberian 
                                                      
23 In summer 2008 both sea lanes were practically ice-free 
simultaneously for the first time in history. 
24 Roderick Kefferputz and Danila Bochkarev, Expanding the 
EU’s Institutional Capacities in the Arctic Region, Heinrich 
Boell Foundation, 2008. 6 | Roderick Kefferpütz 
over-flight payments that cost Asia-bound EU 
airlines flying over Russian territory over €300 
million a year.
25 
Last but not least, there are also clear military interests 
in the High North. The Kola Peninsula, for example, 
hosts Russian Northern Fleet bases and the North Pole 
remains a favourite location for U.S. and Russian 
nuclear submarines due to its strategic proximity to 
both nations’ territories, as well as the technical 
difficulties of detecting passing submarines. 
However, it is clear that besides those tangible 
benefits, intangible ideational factors also play an 
important role for Russia in the Arctic. After suffering 
the collapse of the Soviet Union and losing influence 
in its neighbourhood, many policy-makers in Russia 
consider gaining vast swathes of Arctic territory as just 
compensation.
26 In addition, ‘mastering’ the 
inhospitable High North could be a useful identity-
building project, serving as a platform from which to 
reinforce a ‘derzhava’ (great power) mentality and 
mobilise domestic constituencies.
27 The latter is 
particularly relevant in the light of calls in Russia’s 
Arctic strategy for greater dissemination in the mass 
media of Russia’s national interests in the Arctic 
region, with the aim of ‘formulating a positive image 
of Russia’.
28 
Russian strategy and policy towards the 
Arctic Region 
Much is at stake for Russia in the High North. This has 
naturally led to a very proactive policy towards the 
region. Part of this stems from the belief that moving 
fast will in itself constitute an advantage as it will 
allow Russia to establish a firm position in the Arctic 
to the detriment of its more cautious competitors. 
According to Pavel Baev of Norway’s International 
Peace Research Institute (PRIO), this is a part of 
Russia’s general political behaviour as “the status quo 
is often seen as too restrictive for [Russia’s] newly 
                                                      
25 “Russia agrees to scrap over-flight charges for EU carriers by 
2014”,  Ria.Novosti, 24 November 2006 
(http://en.rian.ru/russia/20061124/55956999.html). 
26 Margaret Blunden, “The New Problem of Arctic Stability”, 
Survival, Vol. 51, No. 5, October-November 2009, pp. 121-142. 
27 This is, as noted by Pavel Baev, parallel with Stalin’s 
triumphalist propaganda campaign of ‘conquering the North’ 
launched in 1936-1939.  
28 “Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii v 
Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dal’neishnuyu perspektivu” 
(The Russian Federation’s main state policy in the Arctic until 
2020 and beyond), 18 September 2008, quote ‘…v tselyakh 
formirovaniya positivnogo imidzha Rossii’ 
(http://www.scrf.gov.ru/documents/98.html). 
consolidated power”.
29 This pro-active approach in the 
Arctic is also confirmed by Nikolai Patrushev, 
Secretary of the Security Council, who has pointed out 
that “if we do not become active now, we will simply 
be forced out”.
30 
The relative speed at which Russia’s Arctic policy is 
advancing has not been at the expense of a multi-
dimensional strategy towards the region, integrating 
military, economic, environmental, social and political 
aspects. This is particularly demonstrated in its main 
“Strategy towards the Arctic until 2020 and beyond”, 
which was ratified on 18 September 2008.
31 This 
strategy aims to transform the region into Russia’s 
future resource base by providing greater investments, 
protecting Russian borders and safeguarding territory, 
ensuring environmental safety, promoting science and 
research, and contributing to international stability.  
The strategy until 2020 is divided into three main 
stages. The first stage (2008-2010) was designed to 
substantiate Russia’s Arctic claim and put it on a 
sound footing by providing extensive scientific 
evidence, in addition to expanding the possibilities for 
international co-operation and establishing a 
framework for the development of port infrastructure, 
high-tech industrial clusters and special economic 
zones in Russia’s northern regions. This phase has 
been relatively successful. Russia has not only 
conducted many scientific missions during this period; 
the Russian Duma has also discussed Northern port 
infrastructure and is soon expected to adopt legislation 
facilitating port investments. In addition, Russia was a 
signatory to the Ilulissat Declaration on 29 May 2008 
in co-operation with the other circumpolar states. This 
declaration, however, was primarily designed to 
reaffirm the sovereignty of the A5 in the High North, 
thus insulating the region from other interested actors. 
The second stage (2011-2015) is supposed to lead to 
international legal recognition of Russia’s external 
borders in the Arctic and expand Russia’s competitive 
advantages in the extraction and transportation of 
resources. In this context, the development of 
infrastructure and communication systems, particularly 
with regards to shipping in the Northern Sea Route, is 
foreseen.  
                                                      
29 Pavel Baev, Russia’s Race for the Arctic and the New 
Geopolitics of the North Pole, The Jamestown Foundation, 
October 2007. 
30 Matthias Schepp and Gerald Traufetter, “Russia Unveils 
Aggressive Arctic Plans”, Der Spiegel, 29 January 2009 
(http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,604338,00.ht
ml).  
31 The Russian Federation’s main state policy in the Arctic until 
2020 and beyond (Osnovy gosudarstvennoi politiki Rossiyskoy 
Federatsii v Arktike na period do 2020 goda i dal’neishnuyu 
perspektivu), 18 September 2008 
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Finally, the third stage (2016-2020) envisions the 
transformation of the High North into the leading 
strategic resource base of the Russian Federation. 
Russia intends to use all of the means at its disposal to 
realise this strategy and protect its interests in the 
Arctic region. As such, it is operating on several levels. 
First and foremost, as mentioned above, it is 
strengthening the scientific evidence to substantiate its 
claims to the Commission on the Limitation of the 
Continental Shelf (CLCS). Second, it is working to 
insulate the region from non-Arctic actors by signing 
the Ilulissat Declaration and blocking the European 
Union’s bid to join the Arctic Council. Third, it is 
investigating the possibility of bilateral co-operation 
with certain Arctic states to the detriment of the others. 
In 2009, for example, Canadian and Russian diplomats 
met informally in Moscow to discuss a common 
approach towards the region. At this meeting, legal 
advisors from both states mulled over the possibility of 
making a joint submission to the CLCS, possibly in 
co-operation with Denmark. Fourth, Moscow aims to 
dramatically expand its capacities in the High North in 
order to increase its operational scope. Russia already 
boasts significant seafaring capacity; it owns not only a 
large fleet of polar-class nuclear-powered icebreakers, 
including the world’s biggest vessel of this class ‘50 
Years of Victory’ (Pyatdesyat Let Pobedy), but also a 
large fleet of non-nuclear and nuclear-powered 
commercial and scientific vessels. Increased funding 
for the construction of new nuclear icebreakers is 
expected, with roughly $150 million planned for 2010-
2011. Russia thereby holds a strategic advantage as its 
polar fleet far surpasses those of its counterparts, in 
performance as well as in size. 
Finally, Moscow aims to guarantee its interests in the 
High North by increasing its military and security 
presence in the region. On an institutional level, for 
example, Nikolai Patrushev, while still Director of the 
Russian Federal Security Service (FSB), created a 
special Arctic Directorate at the FSB in 2004, while in 
March 2009 the Security Council called for the 
establishment of a military unit, in line with the Arctic 
Strategy, that will safeguard the security of Russian 
territory in the Arctic Ocean in any military and 
political environment. In this context, the Security 
Council has also stipulated that the FSB should control 
the Russian border in the High North.  
Russia is also bolstering its military capacity on an 
operational level. For example, Lt.-Gen. Vladimir 
Shamanov, head of the Russian military’s combat 
training directorate, announced plans to increase the 
operational radius of Russia’s northern submarine fleet 
and reinforce the army’s combat readiness along the 
Arctic coast. Russia has also started conducting 
numerous exercises in the region, including paratroop 
drops on the North Pole. Furthermore, in July 2008, 
Moscow announced it would patrol Arctic waters with 
its northern fleet, while in August 2007, the Russian 
Air Force, acting on a directive from Putin, resumed 
long-range bomber flights over the Arctic. Both 
actions had previously been suspended after the end of 
the Cold War. These long-range strategic bomber 
patrols have been deemed particularly controversial by 
Western experts as these flights have supposedly 
included a mock bombing run against Norway’s 
northern command centre at Bodo.
32 
In this context, Western literature (mass media and 
expert commentaries) has been particularly alarmist, 
referring only to Russian military exercises and the 
Kremlin  Strategy for National Security until 2020
33, 
which identified the Arctic region as prone to future 
military conflict, especially over its energy resources. 
It has failed to look past Russia’s security policy 
towards the Arctic and has not taken into account the 
multi-dimensional nature of Russian policy. There is 
more co-operation than meets the eye; after all, the 
Kremlin has had active discussions with the Canadians 
on the Arctic and has conducted many exercises with 
the other riparian states on civilian protection such as 
search and rescue. In addition, Russian military 
manoeuvres in the region should not be treated as 
something extraordinary. The Norwegians themselves 
have stated that Russia’s activities are rather “a return 
to a more normal level of activity for a major power 
with legitimate interests in the region”.
34 While mock-
bombing other states’ installations might be a breach 
of etiquette, regular patrolling is the norm for an 
important global actor.  
Furthermore, the other riparian states have not acted 
very differently to Russia. Ottawa’s Northern 
Strategy,
35 for example, is at times reminiscent of 
Moscow’s Arctic Strategy, and Canada is also 
planning to expand its Arctic military capabilities with 
the construction of eight armed icebreakers, a 
deepwater port near Iqualuit for civilian and military 
purposes, as well as new electronic systems designed 
to detect submarines passing the Northwest Passage.
36 
                                                      
32 “The Arctic contest heats up”, The Economist, 09 October 
2008. 
33  Strategy for National Security until 2020 (Strategiya 
natsional’noy bezopasnosti Rossiizkoy Federatsii do 2020 
goda), No. 537, 12 May 2009 (http://www.scrf.gov.ru).  
34 Statement at NATO Seminar by Norwegian Minister of 
Foreign Affairs, Jonas Gahr Støre, “Current Strategic 
Challenges in the High North”, 29 January 2009 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/ud/about.mfa/minister-of-
foreign-affairs-jonas-gahr-s/Speeches).  
35 Meeting with Dr Michael Byers from the University of 
British Columbia, 24 July 2009. 
36 Although, it has to be noted that the financial and economic 
crisis threw a spanner into some of these plans with past 
promises having been repackaged and the construction of new 
icebreakers put on hold. I am grateful to Dr Michael Byers for 
bringing this point to my attention. 8 | Roderick Kefferpütz 
Ottawa is also holding regular massive integrated 
navy, air force, and army manoeuvres in the Arctic 
under operation ‘Nanook’,
37 which are designed to 
prepare the country for any future challenge to its 
sovereignty, and while Russia’s flag-planting caused a 
furore in the West, Canada’s flag-planting (although 
slightly different as it was limited to a barren 
inhabitable knoll called Hans Island rather than the 
Arctic seabed) gained little attention. Denmark has 
also recently put forth a defence plan for the period 
2010-2014, which includes, similar to Russian plans, 
the establishment of an Arctic military command 
structure and task force ready to operate all over the 
Arctic region. Norway, on the other hand is 
investigating the possibility of a joint Nordic military 
structure,
38 while the 2009 US Presidential Directive 
noted the potential vulnerability of the United States to 
terrorist and criminal acts in the Arctic and inherently 
proposed the boosting of US Arctic capacities. 
In addition, the fact that Russia has many different 
interests in the Arctic and that there are different 
rationales is also not taken fully on board. The panoply 
of interests means there is a divergent array of Russian 
actors with multiple agendas and designs for the region 
and particularly themselves. Arctic militarisation, for 
example, is to a large extent driven by the security and 
defence establishments, who naturally wish to expand 
their operational scope, responsibilities and budgets. In 
this context, they have spoken of new emerging threats 
in the Arctic. Their professionalism, however, should 
not be called into doubt. After all, it is the Armed 
Forces’ duty to analyse and predict future threats and it 
is clear that future confrontation in the High North 
cannot be ruled out. But what it does mean is that their 
own immediate interests of greater budgets and 
expanded operations should not be ignored. The 
military-industrial complex, for example, has only 
been too keen to paint a dramatic picture in the High 
North, lobbying for Russia’s interests in the Arctic in 
the hope of receiving more lucrative contracts. 
Simultaneously, military chest-thumping and 
sovereignty exercises in the region can provide 
politicians with increased popularity amongst the 
electorate. Artur Chilingarov’s trip to the Arctic and 
flag-planting exercise, for example, was primarily 
geared towards the Russian home audience. As Dr 
Michael Byers from the University of British 
Columbia aptly notes: “Russian politicians, just like 
politicians in Denmark and Canada, are sometimes 
                                                      
37 Operation Nanook constitutes one of three major sovereignty 
operations that are conducted each year in the High North by 
the Canadian Forces. 
38 See the report by former Norwegian Foreign Minister, Mr 
Thorvald Stoltenberg entitled Nordic Co-operation on Foreign 
and Security Policy, Oslo, 09 February 2009 
(http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/ud/pressesenter/pressemeldi
nger/2009/nordisk_rapport.html?id=544763).  
focused on domestic politics when they engage in 
international relations concerning the Arctic.”
39 The 
Ministry of Economic Development and Trade 
(MEDT), on the other hand, as well as northern 
regions such as Murmansk, are instead probably 
primarily concerned with painting a stable and 
peaceful picture of the region in order attract foreign 
investment. 
As such, Russian policy towards the Arctic is not only 
far more nuanced than often depicted in Western 
discourse; it is, in fact, at times not that different from 
other states’ policies. It is a very proactive approach 
that is classically Russian in nature to the extent that it 
is comprehensive, oscillating between competition and 
co-operation, and involves an array of actors with 
different agendas. Moscow demonstrates its military 
prowess in the region with mock bombardments and 
military exercises and elbows aside possible 
competitors such as the European Union, whose bid at 
the Arctic Council was also blocked by Ottawa, while 
simultaneously exploring the possibility of a joint 
claim with Canada, co-operating with the European 
Union in the Arctic through the Northern Dimension 
(ND) Programme, and actively participating in Arctic 
governance. Regrettably, the more heavy-handed 
approach has by far received most of the attention.  
Conclusion 
In conclusion, as has been stated above, Russia’s 
Arctic policy is multi-dimensional and cannot be 
simply reduced to its security dimension. Failing to 
take this into account could lead to the formulation of 
inadequate policies that would endanger the stability of 
the High North. For example, placing too great an 
emphasis on Russia’s Sturm und Drang approach and 
failing to more broadly contextualise Russian policies 
could lead to greater collective action by the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization to the detriment of 
Russia. NATO has already signalled an interest in 
expanding its scope into the Arctic Region and has 
recently conducted the Cold Response military 
exercise in 2009, in which more than 7,000 soldiers 
from 13 nations participated.
40 Naturally, this exercise 
was not well-received in Moscow and many Russian 
military experts claim that while Russia is keeping 
within the international legal framework, NATO is 
using allegations of Russian aggression to justify its 
own military ambitions in the region.
41 
                                                      
39 Bruce Campion-Smith, “Cold War posturing often mainly 
intended for domestic politics”, Toronto Star, 15 August 2009. 
40 “Stronger NATO presence in the Arctic”, Barents Observer, 
21 August 2009. 
41 See for example, Viktor Ruchkin, “Barabany b’yut v 
Arktike” (The drums are beating in the Arctic), Krasnaya 
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Russia has great sensitivities surrounding the Arctic 
and its proactive approach is not only a result of 
wanting to gain a favourable position to secure its 
national interests but is also related to constructivist 
factors. More and more actors are keen to play a role in 
the Arctic and understandably Russia therefore fears a 
loss of influence. The fact that Russia partially uses the 
region as an identity-building project tends to 
complicate matters as Moscow invests a lot of pride 
and prestige in the High North. 
Western
42 policy towards the region must take these 
realities into account, in addition to realising that 
Russia views the other riparian states’ policies as not 
so different from its own. Enhancing NATO’s role in 
the region without acknowledging and trying to 
integrate Russian interests will reinforce Russia’s 
sense of strategic isolation and aggravate the security 
dilemma in the region. This does not mean Western 
policy should be held hostage by Russian sensitivities; 
it does, however, mean that Russia must be included 
when formulating a policy for the Arctic.  
This will undoubtedly be an incredibly difficult 
balance to strike. Failure to do so however, could have 
detrimental consequences; putting the overall strategic 
objective of maintaining stability and peace in the 
region at risk. 
                                                      
42 The term ‘Western’ is used here to represent the other 
riparian states and the European Union although it is quite clear 
that the so-called ‘West’ itself is quite divided with regards to 
the Arctic.  
Annex. Map of the Arctic region 
Source: “Geopolitique de l’Arctique: la course pour les ressources”, 19 October 2007, by Philippe Rekacewicz, Monde Diplomatique. 